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In research dealingwith religious afﬁliation, generic nonreligious categories – ‘no
religion’, ‘not religious’, ‘nonreligious’, ‘nones’ – are frequently used to measure
secularity and secularisation processes. Analysis of these categories is, however,
problematic because they have not received dedicated methodological attention.
Using qualitative research conducted in the UK, this article investigates what
nonreligious categories measure and, speciﬁcally, whether they indicate non-
identiﬁcation or disafﬁliation as assumedor an alternative formof cultural afﬁlia-
tion. Findings suggest that generic nonreligious categories are sometimes used to
express substantive positions and public identities, and that these are diverse.
These ﬁndings ﬂatten distinctions between religious and nonreligious categories
as ‘positive’and ‘negative’ respectively and indicate problems therefore in using
nonreligious identiﬁcation to measure secularity and secularisation. They
suggest nonreligious identiﬁcation is, however, a useful indicator of the
advance of nonreligious cultures and the ‘nonreligionisation’ of societies.
KEY WORDS: nonreligion and secularity; quantitative methods; atheist identities;
indifference to religion; secularisation; nonreligionisation; religion in Britain;
religious identities; disafﬁliation
The generic nonreligious categories frequently used in survey questionnaires appear
to differ fundamentally from other identiﬁcation or afﬁliation categories. Whether
phrased as ‘no religion’, ‘not religious’, ‘nonreligious’ or ‘none’, these categories
are apparently negative, allowing participants to record that a form of cultural identi-
ﬁcation lacksmeaning or relevance to themor is perhaps entirely absent in their lives.
Consequently, social researchers and reporters often describe and interpret the use of
these categories as acts of ‘disafﬁliation’ or ‘non-identiﬁcation’. Generic nonreligious
categories seem, therefore, distinct from more explicitly positive confessional classi-
ﬁcations that are also offered in religious identiﬁcation survey questions. Selecting a
category like ‘Christian’ or ‘Hindu’ indicates that a respondent is familiar with this
term as a cultural marker and that it is meaningful to them to some degree. Such cat-
egories allow respondents to share an emic representation – the one that they would
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use in daily life or a reasonable proxy for the one they might normally prefer (‘Chris-
tian’ instead of ‘Anglican’, for example). By contrast, generic nonreligious options
seem to be etic categories, used to locate the remaining individuals inside an analyti-
cal rather than a phenomenological framework. As Pasquale (2007, n.p.) says of the
‘none’ category, the terms themselves indicate that they are ‘a function of survey
method rather than a self-description’.
In many countries in the world, increasing and large numbers of people are
today choosing generic nonreligious categories: in Britain, the empirical focus of
this article, 51 percent selected ‘no religion’ in the British Social Attitudes survey
in 2009. Yet these categories have not received dedicated methodological attention.
In particular, qualitative research is needed to understand how respondents inter-
pret these categories and what they seek to express by selecting them. This meth-
odological question does not undermine research which takes nonreligious
populations as a starting point or component part such as demographic research
(e.g., Keysar 2007; Voas and McAndrew 2012; Wilson and Sherkat 1994), investi-
gations into the stability of nonreligious populations (e.g., Lim, MacGregor, and
Putnam 2010) or research investigating how nonreligious identiﬁcation correlates
or combines with other measures of religiosity and nonreligiosity, namely,
belief and practice (e.g., Sherkat 2008; Storm 2009; Voas 2009). Such work enriches
our understanding of nonreligious populations. Yet qualitative research is also
needed if we are to understand the efﬁcacy and meaning of demarcating nonreli-
gious populations in this way, just as we call on ethnographic knowledge to under-
stand and interrogate religious categories like ‘Christian’ when they are used in
social research. How do we know therefore that people selecting generic nonreli-
gious categories are being forced to take up the analyst’s language, as Pasquale
suggests, rather than identifying themselves as they would in their everyday
lives? Enriching our understanding of nonreligious categories in this way will
deepen analyses and interpretation of the populations they capture.
The objective of this article is, therefore, to use ethnographic data to investigate
and understand what it is that generic nonreligious categories actually measure.
The most common use of data generated by generic nonreligious categories is to
indicate secularity and secularisation, and the second objective of this article is to
scrutinise the validity of this application. The study suggests that respondents
use generic nonreligious categories to identify with substantive nonreligious and
spiritual cultures more commonly than scholars and even respondents themselves
appreciate and that we cannot therefore assume that their use indicates disafﬁlia-
tion or non-identiﬁcation rather than afﬁliation and identiﬁcation. The nonreligious
and spiritual cultures they can be used to express are, however, diverse and this
limits our ability to deduce the spread of different nonreligious or spiritual cultures
from the data they generate. On the other hand, these ﬁndings ﬂatten distinctions
between religious and nonreligious categories as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ respect-
ively and, whilst problematising its use as measure of secularity and secularisation,
they also suggest that nonreligious identiﬁcation is a useful indicator of the
advance of nonreligious cultures and the ‘nonreligionisation’ of societies.
Background: positives and negatives
This paper addresses: (1) insufﬁcient methodological scrutiny of generic nonreli-
gious categories; and (2) the assumption that these categories are necessarily
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negative and measure secularity and secularisation. These two issues are in fact
closely related and derive from the secularisation paradigm in which they
emerge. Secularisation theory, like the dominant Western theologies that preceded
it and continue today (Fitzgerald 2000), views religion as a singular phenomenon
with no complete equivalent in the secular world. Hence, the research method-
ologies used to investigate religion and secularity are both religion focused, the
former concerned with religion itself and the latter concerned with the decline of
religion towards the zero point rather than attending to how religious phenomena
are reshaped and remoulded in secular settings (Lee 2012b; Taylor 2007). General
nonreligious identiﬁcation options have been developed in this context and for
this second purpose. They have therefore received minimal methodological atten-
tion because, on the one hand, they are of secondary or ‘residual’ interest to the
primary concern, religion itself (Campbell 2013 [1971]; Pasquale 2007), and, on
the other hand, in their apparent negativity, these categories appear perfectly
equipped to capture what is seen to be the only meaningful alternative to religios-
ity: its absence.
There is some reason to believe, however, that these linked theoretical and meth-
odological assumptions are unsatisfactory. One of these is the observation that
these categories in fact capture concrete nonreligious identities such as ‘atheist’
and ‘humanist’ and that they require respondents to afﬁrm a position in relation
to religion and are positive in that sense also. This point has been argued by Day
(2011) who lobbied successfully for the decennial census for England and Wales
to change its ‘none’ category from 2001 to a ‘no religion’ category in 2011 in
view of this. In summary of that work, Day (2013, 107) says:
The word ‘none’ seemed to imply an absence of beliefs, faith or values and under-
mines the complex identities of people, such as secular humanists, who hold
many beliefs and values, albeit not religious ones.
In other work, Day (2011) has explored the meaning behind religious and non-
religious identiﬁcations, arguing that people use both of these options to identify
themselves in relation to the people and groups to which they belong. This research
indicates that selecting nonreligious categories may have some substance or
meaning rather than being merely or purely negative.
The assumption that generic nonreligious categories are negative also sits in
tension with work that notices a difference between negative secularity and posi-
tive nonreligion, also referred to as secularism by some authors. This distinction
is as follows. Secularisation involves the marginalisation of religion in one or
several spheres of social life; secularity is when religion is relatively, though not
necessarily absolutely, marginal.1 Irreligion is the rejection of religion (Campbell
2013 [1971]) and nonreligion is a related, more inclusive concept indicating any-
thing that is identiﬁed by how it differs from religion, regardless of whether this
sense of difference involves hostility, dismissiveness, curiosity or even veneration
(Lee 2012a). Examples of nonreligion include popular cultures like the New
1Although some scholars emphasise differentiation over marginalisation, they do not mean to describe
internal compartmentalisation within a still religious whole, but rather compartmentalisation as well as
the marginalisation of religion within at least one of these newly differentiated spheres, politics being the
most often mentioned. Though some would protest, therefore, marginalisation and marginality are the
best and most useful ways to understand secularisation and secularity (Lee 2012b).
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Atheism or rituals and practices developed in contradistinction from prior religious
ones like many civil ceremonies and seasonal festivals. Thus, secularity is a concept
used analytically to study the relative signiﬁcance of religion whereas nonreligion
can be used descriptively, to outline the presence, nature and impact of distinctive
social phenomena. In this sense, secularity is a negative category whilst nonreligion
and irreligion are positive ones and the two are clearly distinct (Lee 2012b). If
people and things can be not religious in these quite different negative and positive
senses, this then raises a question about which of these it is that generic nonreli-
gious identiﬁcations measure.
Arguably, secularity and nonreligion are two sides of the same coin, in which
case it might not matter either way. However, the relationship between nonreligion
and secularity is an open and signiﬁcant theoretical question. For secularisation
theorist Steve Bruce (2002, 42), for example, a high level of engaged irreligion is
a sign of a still-religious society, whereas secularity involves indifference towards
religion – and, we might argue, towards irreligion also. Campbell (2013 [1971])
makes the same distinction between irreligion and secularity but a slightly different
argument. His contention is that irreligious cultures may be drivers of secularisa-
tion processes, a view that might imply that irreligious movements are part of
the transition to (post-(ir)religious) secular society but might equally imply that
irreligious cultures are in fact a necessary and intrinsic feature of secular societies,
crucial for the maintenance and longevity of secularity. The latter case has some res-
onances with Taylor’s (2007) and others’ pluralist understandings of secularity in
which substantive nonreligion – or unbelief, in Taylor’s belief-centred approach –
is a crucial ingredient and determinant of secularity. In this model, sometimes
referred to as ‘postsecular’, negativity plays a marginal role altogether; instead,
both secularity and nonreligion are deﬁned in positive terms. Understanding the
extent to which people use nonreligious categories to express an engaged or disen-
gaged position will make it possible to apply the data they capture to the question
these alternative possibilities raise. For example, if generic nonreligious categories
are chosen by people wishing to register their indifference to religious, spiritual and
nonreligious cultures, this would be at odds with the Taylorian model, but consist-
ent with Bruce’s formulation of secularisation theory.
Methods and data
This paper is based on ethnographic ﬁeldwork conducted in the UK, and particu-
larly on data gathered in interviews with people identifying as ‘not religious’ or
‘nonreligious’ rather than ‘religious’. These in-depth, semi-structured interviews
were conducted in Cambridge in 2006 (n: 12) and Greater London between
2009 and 2011 (n: 30) and explored participants’ understandings and experience
of religious cultures and ‘religious-like’ things (life-cycle ceremonies, for
example) in relation to their general nonreligious identiﬁcation. In order to
explore the potential variety of positions and meanings that underlie generic non-
religious identiﬁcations, the sampling approach sought to maximise variation by
working with people who differed according to an array of demographic charac-
teristics (age, gender, race, religious background), although recruitment methods
meant that the ﬁnal sample was biased towards those with tertiary-level
education. Asking interviewees to imagine they were responding to the census,
interviews typically began with a discussion of their general religious
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self-classiﬁcation – their ‘hospital clipboard’ identiﬁcation, as one participant
referred to it. Typical survey options (mainstream denominations – Christian,
Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, etc. – and a generic nonreligious one, ‘no religion’ or
‘none’) were often provided as a prompt. The typical discussion then opened
out into broader discussion of self-classiﬁcation and, in turn, a wider discussion
of issues relating to religion. A full review of the methodology used to gather
these data can be found in Lee (2012b).
Findings
The ﬁndings from these interviews suggest that generic nonreligious categories are
more likely to measure afﬁliation to a nonreligious or spiritual culture than has pre-
viously been recognised. In fact, the term had some meaning for all participants
making use of it. However, generic nonreligious self-classiﬁcation was used to
different ends. This section outlines the main ones of these. In summary, ‘nonreli-
gion’ (or equivalent generic nonreligious category) was used,
(1) as a proxy or synonym for another nonreligious identity
(2) to indicate a loose or general nonreligious position
(3) in contradistinction to ‘religion’ by people of an alternatively spiritual
orientation
(4) to express spiritual and non-spiritual non-nominal identities
(5) to express ‘engaged indifferentism’
A type of nonreligion
Most obviously, perhaps, respondents used generic nonreligious categories as
proxies for other nonreligious identiﬁcations. In Western culture, ‘atheist’, ‘agnos-
tic’ and ‘humanist’ are commonplace nonreligious identities and this was reﬂected
in these data. Cat,2 for example, a 26 year-old charity campaigns ofﬁcer from
London, said that she thought she would chose ‘no religion’ from the census
options, but when I asked her what she would do if ‘atheism’ and ‘agnostic’
were also provided as options, she said, ‘Oh, that’s very difﬁcult’ before explaining
that she would probably still prefer the ‘no religion’ category because it was, in her
view, a better proxy for her preferred identiﬁcation, ‘humanist’. In Cat’s view, there-
fore, ‘generic’ nonreligious classiﬁcations had a distinctive character but could be
used as a reasonable proxy for her preferred identiﬁer. She explained why she
would prefer a ‘no religion’ option to an ‘atheist’ or ‘agnostic’ one:
[Because] I think I identify more with ‘humanist’ than ‘atheist’. I’m deﬁnitely not
agnostic… but I don’t think it would be particularly useful to type ‘humanist’
because I think that would come out with really low numbers because so many
people don’t really know what it is, so it would be a political decision not to
put ‘humanist’. If there was a ‘humanist’ box I’d tick it but if it was ‘atheist’ or
‘agnostic’ box I wouldn’t tick it; I’d just go with ‘no religion’.
This preference for ‘no religion’ over ‘atheist’ or ‘agnostic’ was despite the fact that
Cat actually identiﬁed atheism as fundamental to her understanding of humanism:
2Pseudonyms have been used to anonymise research participants.
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For me, if you believe in God, you’re not a humanist.… some people will disagree
with that, but, for me, that is a fundamental thing because ‘humanist’ has to focus
on the fact that human beings can make the world better for themselves by
working for each other.… I mean it is very complicated but if there is any sugges-
tion of there being a creator or there being some sort of score sheet at the end,
that’s not humanist at all.
Cat did not detail her concerns with ‘atheist’ as a self-identiﬁcation but her discus-
sion highlights that her preference is shaped by social rather than intellectual
associations with these terms. Her discussion also highlights subtle differences
between nonreligious representations like ‘atheist’, ‘nonreligious’ and ‘humanist’
that are not always recognised and treated as more straightforwardly interchange-
able than they are. Nevertheless, Cat’s discussion illustrates the use of generic non-
religious categories as a stand-in for other nonreligious ones.
Some interviewees did use generic nonreligious classiﬁcations interchangeably
with other nonreligious classiﬁcations, sometimes preferring one or other accord-
ing to different social contexts or meanings. Cat’s discussion provides an
example of this situational aspect to nonreligious identiﬁcation when she says
that her choice is ‘political’ (‘it would be a political decision not to put “humanist”’).
An awareness of popular (mis)perceptions of ‘atheism’ is another reason given by
research participants as to why they might identify as ‘nonreligious’ in one setting
and ‘atheist’ in another. Victoria, an editor from London in her late 20s, identiﬁed
herself as ‘nonreligious’ but later introduced scenarios in which she would describe
herself as ‘atheist’. Reﬂecting on this, she said,
I suppose it depends who you’re talking to. Cause if I was talking to someone who
was really religious, it might somehow seem a bit, um, aggressive to say I was an
‘atheist’ or something, so I’d probably say ‘I’m not religious’.
For Victoria, ‘atheist’ and ‘nonreligious’ were so consistent in meaning that they
could be substituted as required and she was content with either to represent her
position. Whilst Cat uses generic nonreligious categories as a proxy for her preferred
term, Victoria is typical of many others in using generic and speciﬁc nonreligious cat-
egories interchangeably to express a single, more or less coherent position.
Generic nonreligious identities
Some people regarded a general nonreligious identiﬁcation as more or less synon-
ymous with another term. Victoria, for example, makes a distinction between ‘non-
religion’ and ‘atheism’ that is more to do with social context and social connotation
than with meaning. However, describing oneself as ‘not religious’ or ‘nonreligious’,
having ‘no religion’ or ‘none’ was sometimes understood to be the more general
term; indeed, it might be that the softness Victoria associated with it has to do
with these categories being less determined, less thought through. In relation to
this, it is worth noting that, in interviews and in other aspects of ﬁeldwork, dissatis-
faction with available nonreligious identiﬁcations was commonly expressed. In the
context of research, it became clear that what I had initially conceived of as a wide
array of nonreligious identity labels – ‘atheist’, ‘agnostic’, ‘free-thinker’, ‘rationalist’,
‘sceptic’, ‘Bright’or ‘humanist’ – actually presents a limited range. ‘Humanism’apart
perhaps, all of these terms are explicitly or culturally identiﬁed with a rationalist cri-
tique of religion and are focused on the cognitive aspects of religion rather than the
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practical or social which many nonreligious people recognise. As a result, when I
presented interviewees with a long list of these identity labels, it was possible for
people to reply that they would identify with all of them – or none. For those
unhappy with or uninterested in these nonreligious cultures, alternative represen-
tations are not always forthcoming, leading to an unresolved ambivalence about
nonreligious self-representation. This ambivalence is seen in the British context, as
elsewhere (cf. Taira 2012), in the use of qualiﬁed identities: ‘I’m an atheist but I’m
not a New Atheist’; ‘I’m an atheist but not a Richard Dawkins-style atheist.’ The
‘atheist plus’ identity which has emerged in recent years is a nonreligious identity
which responds creatively to a demand for more diverse nonreligious represen-
tations whilst also illustrating the hold that established terms have upon our cultural
imaginations. For those people whose nonreligious identities are still emerging or
developing, generic nonreligious categories do not act as a proxy for a more speciﬁc
identity but are used in want of a better word.
‘Spiritual but not religious’
Because my sampling method only made a distinction between religious and non-
religious positions, it included people who reject traditional religiosity and/or reli-
gions but who are alternatively spiritual. As Crowley (2014) says in her
contribution to this special issue (drawing on work by Davie, Heelas, and Wood-
head 2003), alternative spiritualities are often articulated or deﬁned according to
how they differ from traditional forms of religion. They are therefore nonreligious
to this extent. That is, alternatively spiritual people frequently make use of nonre-
ligious discursive strategies to articulate identities and cultural afﬁliations that are
not more widely nonreligious in character. Where only conventional religious
denominations are provided on surveys, it is likely that generic nonreligious cat-
egories will be favoured by many in this group. The extent to which generic non-
religious classiﬁcations are used to record ‘spiritual but not religious’ identities is
sometimes, though inconsistently, recognised by scholars, and is certainly excluded
in discussions which assume that ‘the nones’ are nonreligious in general terms.
Non-nominal identities
Rather than synonyms or stand-ins for other terms, generic nonreligious categories
are also conceptually salient for two groups. Firstly, they appeal to people who seek
to reject categorisation in general, a group I describe as ‘non-nominal’. Counter-
intuitively, the negative term helps to describe this outlook, which involves a
perceived liberation from restrictive classiﬁcatory frameworks. When included,
‘spiritual but not religious’ categories also provide some people with an option
for expressing the non-nominal perspective: ‘religion’ is often associated with its
institutional forms, whereas spirituality is perceived to be the underlying experi-
ence. Although the largest volunteered ‘religion’ in the census for England and
Wales was Paganism – a tradition often categorised as an alternative spirituality
and associated with the ‘New Age’ – a resistance to classiﬁcations makes generic
nonreligious categories another option for this group, as Crowley (2014) discusses
in her contribution to this volume.
Importantly, however, this research indicates that the non-nominal group is not
limited to the spiritual because some non-nominal people reject spiritual cultures as
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well as religious ones. Jude, a South African graduate student living and working
in Cambridge, said:
I think that at times there’s a sense of knowing within myself that it’s something
that doesn’t require scientiﬁc or rational explanation, and it works on its own
regardless. That is some sort of additional, I don’t know, connection. Some
people might call it religious, some people might call it spiritual, I’m not sure
what I’d call it. [… ] See for me [… ] I think over-analysing that space kills it; I
think belonging to a religion kills it; because I prefer the idea that it’s unexplained
– because that makes life more exciting.
Jude’s non-nominalism is discursive, but it is also substantive, involving a venera-
tion of the unknown, ineffable and the uncategorised. This veneration of the
unknown is seen in traditional religious and alternatively spiritual cultures, but
this research also encountered materialist forms of romantic mysticism. Whilst
they shared some of alternative spirituality’s romanticism, individualism and
non-nominalism, and rejected rationalist immanent cultures along these lines,
this group also shared a naturalist and humanistic outlook with the latter and
rejected the more extensive focus on subjectivity that is associated with alternative
spirituality (Heelas andWoodhead 2005). The naturalist non-nominalists are there-
fore a distinct group and, importantly for this discussion, they used nonreligious
categories as their primary and emic mode of identiﬁcation. Emic identiﬁcation
with generic nonreligious categories has a substantive basis: naturalist non-nomin-
alists state a rejection of all forms of categorisation – perceived to be too ﬂuid, amor-
phous, restrictive or repressive to be applicable or pleasant – but they also have a
strong sense of otherness from the concepts of religion and spirituality which gives
the negative formulation, ‘nonreligion’, a double resonance.
The use of generic categories to express non-nominal positions of all sorts raises a
useful possibility for methodologists seeking to measure modern religiosity and
nonreligiosity. Whereas scholars like Campbell (2013 [1971]) and Pasquale (2007)
have critiqued generic nonreligious categories for being too general and under-
determined, closer attention to the orientations that people are attempting to
express through them suggests that these categories sometimes measure speciﬁc,
ﬁrst-order identiﬁcations. Some survey designers have sought to replace general
categories with ones they consider to be emic such as ‘atheist’ and ‘humanist’;
this study shows that apparently generic categories might in fact have the same
emic validity themselves. What is more, it may well be that general-sounding
identiﬁcations will be increasingly signiﬁcant in the context of individualised
societies in which institutional identities make less and less sense. Instead of
doing away with general nonreligious categories, it might therefore be helpful to
include them on afﬁliation surveys as well as other general categories – ‘religious’,
‘spiritual’ – in addition to alternative self-classiﬁcations, such as ‘atheist’ or ‘huma-
nist’, ‘Christian’or ‘Muslim’. This approach might work best if respondents are able
to select multiple options, to prevent confusion for those who see generic and
speciﬁc categories as part of a classiﬁcatory hierarchy; for example, some respon-
dents might prefer to choose ‘religious’ and ‘Christian’ or ‘humanist’ and ‘not reli-
gious’whilst others might see a general ‘religious’or ‘nonreligious’afﬁliation as the
truest account of their self-understanding.
Expanding the use of general categories would allow researchers to investigate
how pervasive the emic use of generic nonreligious, religious and spiritual
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categories are, whereas, because other generic categories are not always included
alongside nonreligious ones, it is currently difﬁcult to assess the extent to which
nonreligious categories are capturing those who prefer not to classify themselves
at all or those who wish to register (consciously or sub-consciously) a sense of
otherness from religion – people for whom being differentiated from a perceived
religious other is the one form of categorisation they want to make. The inclusion
of a range of generic categories as well as nonreligious ones and, signiﬁcantly, a
‘none of the above’ option would allow participants to opt out or reject all cat-
egories and/or attempts to categorise. By offering this variety, such an approach
has the potential to vastly improve our understanding of ‘religious landscapes’
that include non-institutional as well as institutional forms of religious, spiritual
and nonreligious identities.
Indifferentism
Another speciﬁc end to which apparently general nonreligious classiﬁcations can
be put is to express a position that I have called ‘indifferentism’ or ‘engaged indif-
ferentism’, a position that is signiﬁcant in the British context of this research.
Engaged indifferentism can be distinguished from indifference itself: indifferentism
is when disinterest in religion (and sometimes in overt forms of nonreligion also) is
the core aspect of an individual’s ‘religious’ identity and is something they are
invested in and committed to. Because their ‘indifference’ is an important part of
their identity it is therefore misnamed. Thus, indifferentism is distinct from
actual indifference or disengagement from religion, in which the individual
might not, for example, mind being (mis)identiﬁed as religious. Though a positive
rather than a negative phenomenon therefore, the negative formulation of generic
nonreligious identities appeals to indifferentists precisely because it disclaims any
engagement and can be used to locate themselves outside of religious culture in
general.
For example, Victoria’s initial identiﬁcation as ‘nonreligious’ was intended, she
said, to accurately present her lack of interest in topic:
If I was to say I was ‘atheist’, it sort of suggests I actively pursue that in a kind of
formal way. Erm. Whereas, I don’t really give it a huge amount of thought very
often.
In the same way, Edward, an academic in his 70s, also living in London, described
himself using the terms ‘none’ and ‘areligious’ in order to identify what he viewed
as his overwhelming indifference to the subject matter: at the beginning of our
interview Edward questioned whether he was an appropriate participant in the
research at all, saying ‘I am not anti-religious but I’m just, you know, uninvolved.’
In these cases, it is precisely the generic quality of such categories that appeals.
Despite these secular identities, however, Victoria and Edward engaged with
religion, spirituality and/or nonreligion in diverse and meaningful ways. Victoria,
for example, was privately and publicly committed to a nonreligious stance that she
identiﬁed elsewhere as ‘atheism’: she expressed, for example, a strong antipathy
towards the institution of marriage and towards church weddings in particular
and she understood this in relation to her ‘atheist’ views; she was strongly critical
of people who used church services when they were not actively religious, viewing
it as hypocritical and morally weak; and, in her social life, she described how
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discovering that a friend was religious came as a shock and acted as a barrier to
easy conversation between them thereafter. In fact, Victoria’s self-understanding
as ‘indifferent’ wavered over the course of the interview and this gave her an
opportunity to reﬂect on a range of different social identities and behaviours that
might not be brought into contact with each other in her normal life. By contrast,
Edward never wavered in his self-understanding as indifferent, yet he also
described points of engagement with religion, spirituality and nonreligion in the
course of our discussion that suggested he was far from indifferent: he was able
to locate his beliefs in relation to friends and acquaintances’, most of whom he
could classify in religious and nonreligious terms and sometimes in great detail;
he discussed the nonreligious views he shared with his wife, and stated that he
valued this shared perspective very highly; and, discussing his parents’ religion,
Edward positioned himself in relation to a long history, going back not just one
or two generations, but several centuries:
So my family, my father’s family, was Presbyterian. They had been Presbyterian
for three hundred years, three hundred and ﬁfty years actually and they had –
they were forced out before the Civil War because they were radical Puritans of
what later became Presbyterianism…
This 350-year-long history is a characterful illustration of the way in which people
who understand themselves as indifferent can be highly engagedwith nonreligious
and religious cultures. The somewhat counter-intuitive proposition of engaged
indifferentism is summed up well by one younger man (Walt, a researcher in his
mid-30s) who reﬂected on some of the strong and often acutely emotional commit-
ments to especially nonreligious culture that he had discussed over the course of
our interview, saying:
I tend to think that I don’t really care – you know, like I said before: I’m such an
atheist that I don’t care. But obviously I do.
As well as strength of feeling, the embeddedness of a nonreligious orientation
also leads to people taking that position for granted such that they consider them-
selves to be indifferent. Consider the following vignette, from discussion with
Jonathan, a journalist from London, living for a time in New York. We are discuss-
ing his self-classiﬁcation and whether identifying himself in this way is something
he can recall doing in social settings. He says:
No, I don’t [identify my (non)religion in social settings] – no, I don’t feel like it’s a
signiﬁcant part of my life, like, explaining my situation. I live in New York now
and a huge portion of my friends are sort of secular Jews. Um, you know, I’ve
been to more Seder dinners in the last four years than I have, at all, growing up
with a nominally Jewish father and, um, this stuff just never comes up: they
seem to exist in a very comfortable, kind of – happy to perform rituals without
needing to make a deal about [it]. I’m talking about it now, but I wouldn’t say
that… [breaks off].
Jonathan identiﬁes his friends in religious and nonreligous terms, ‘secular Jews’; he
is frequently participating in ‘rituals’ that are both religious and nonreligious in
nature; and he is enjoying this participation. Yet he indicates that identifying
himself in (non)religious terms for the purpose of our interview is unusual, even
artiﬁcial (‘I’m talking about it now, but… ’), dismisses having a (non)religious iden-
tity as making ‘a deal’ out of something unnecessarily and says that explaining his
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position is not a big part of his life. Jonathan’s practice and self-perception are there-
fore somewhat at odds, and this is partly because he and his friends apparently
communicate their (non)religious identities tacitly, though clearly, through their
everyday discussion and practice. It is precisely because his engagement with reli-
gion and nonreligion feels unexceptional and quotidian that convinces Jonathan
that he’s not really interested:
I wouldn’t want to give the impression, because we’re focusing on it in this con-
versation, that it, like, weighs on my mind and I have to describe myself a lot in
that… I choo – I opt into pub arguments against people who are sort of like
Dawkins atheists, but that’s for fun.
Here, engagement with nonreligion does not really count when it is just ‘for fun’.
Yet, Jonathan chooses to participate in discussions on the topic. In response to a
question about belief in God or a higher power, Jonathan says he ‘would screw
up the survey and throw it across the room’ because it fails to accommodate the
complexity of the issue – because he ‘would want to write an essay about’ it.
These examples from Jonathan illustrate an engaged (non)religious stance self-
understood as indifferent precisely because it is so established that it seems unex-
ceptional – a possibility that Bagg and Voas (2010) speculate about in their chapter
on the pervasiveness of British indifference.
For indifferentists, like Victoria, Edward, Walt and Jonathan, therefore, generic
nonreligious categories are not residual but apposite self-classiﬁcations. The nega-
tive form ﬁts with a self-understanding as a person lacking cultural attachment and
its generality communicates non-engagement; at the same time, the ‘non’ allows
participants to distance themselves from religious cultures and ensures that they
are not being mis-positioned in the cultural milieu. As with non-nominalism, for
indifferentists, generic nonreligious concepts are emic or ﬁrst-order categories.
Discussion: secularisation and nonreligionisation
One of the core implications of this research is that nonreligious identiﬁcation
cannot be used as a direct measure of secularity. Whilst the number of people afﬁli-
ating with confessions may indicate the salience of ‘religion’ as a category and tell
us something about the signiﬁcance of religion in contemporary discourses, afﬁlia-
tion data do not reveal anything more extensive about secularisation because it is
not possible to differentiate between positive nonreligious identities and minimal
or negative ones. These examples demonstrate that generic nonreligious categories
can be used to describe an array of concrete spiritual and nonreligious afﬁliations,
but this does not mean that they necessarily do. Walt, for example, would prefer to
say, ‘none’ if asked about his religion, or ‘nonreligious’, ‘because’, he explained, ‘I
would think of it in terms of afﬁliation to an organisation.’ In such cases, people are
not expressing a generalised disafﬁliation but a speciﬁc form of disafﬁliation – from
traditional, institutional religion. What is more, there are other indications that rela-
tively large numbers of people are actually indifferent to religion, spirituality and
nonreligion. For example, 22 percent of Britons say that neither religion nor nonre-
ligion is very signiﬁcant to them (Table 1). However, the relationship between indif-
ference and religious, spiritual and nonreligious identiﬁcations is complicated and
there is no reason to suppose that nonreligious categories capture the indifferent or
secular population more effectively than religious categories do. In this section, I
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detail the problems of using nonreligious identiﬁcation data to measure secularity
and secularisation, and argue that they are, however, a useful indicator of nonreli-
gious cultures and the ‘nonreligionisation’ of societies.
Nonreligious identities and secularity
There are three important correctives to assuming a particularly strong afﬁnity
between nonreligious categories and indifference or ‘secularity’. The most impor-
tant of these is the inclusion of real ‘opt-out’options in addition to nonreligious cat-
egories in some datasets. The census for England and Wales is one example of this
because its ‘religion question’ was, unlike every other question, voluntary and
respondents were made aware that they did not need to answer it. As a result,
the censuses of 2001 and 2011 not only recorded the number of people who said
they had ‘none’ or ‘no religion’ respectively, but also made a separate record of
the number of people who declined to answer the question entirely. In both
years, the ‘not stated’ category was in fact the third most popular one, after the
‘Christian’ and ‘none’/‘no religion’ categories and it was double the size of the
next largest category, the ‘Muslim’ group. In 2011, 4 038 032 did not state a religion,
a decline from 4 433 520 in 2001. Representing a slight decline in percentage terms,
the nearly 400 000 people who decided to state a ‘religion’ in 2011 is a signiﬁcant
ﬁgure in its own right, larger in fact than most of the minority religious afﬁliations
–more than the 263 346 people who said that they were ‘Jewish’on the 2011 census,
for example. Although the ‘voluntary’ status of this question is particular to obliga-
tory surveys like the census, other surveys allow people to record a ‘not sure’or ‘not
stated’option. The scale and signiﬁcance of these ‘opt out’ groups is interesting and
deserves further research; for the purposes of this discussion, the important point is
that these real opt-out options highlight the extent to which generic nonreligious
categories are opt-in ones, involving identiﬁcation rather than non-identiﬁcation.
Accurate reporting would describe the ‘not stated’ group as having made neither
a religious nor a nonreligious identiﬁcation.
Secondly, the qualitative data discussed in this paper correlate with quantitat-
ive indications that the nonreligious population is distinct from the secular one.
For example, in their reporting of British Social Attitudes survey ﬁndings con-
cerning British religion and nonreligion, Voas and Ling (2010) include data con-
cerning how religious or nonreligious British and American respondents
consider themselves to be (Table 1) and ﬁnd that a large number of nonreligious
people feel strongly about their nonreligiosity. In fact, in the UK, more people
Table 1. Religion and non-religious commitment.
Britain United States
Respondent describes themselves as… percent percent
… very or extremely religious 7 26
… somewhat religious 30 51
… neither religious nor non-religious 22 7
… somewhat non-religious 11 6
… very or extremely non-religious 26 9
1986 1365
Source: Voas and Ling (2010, 71).
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identify as strongly nonreligious (26 percent) than identify as strongly religious (7
percent). In total, 37 percent of the population measure their nonreligiosity in
positive terms, exactly the same number who identiﬁed as atheist or agnostic
about the existence of God in that year and only slightly less than the number
who said they had no religion. Given that survey methodologies have been
shaped by religious singularism, it is unlikely that this item was designed to
measure explicit nonreligiosity, but the possibility of being ‘very or extremely
non-religious’ nevertheless transforms it into a measure of substantive nonreli-
gion. This measure is notable for being a rare case in which indifference is
measured relative to both religion and nonreligion.
If the ﬁndings presented in this paper ﬂatten distinctions between religious cat-
egories and nonreligious categories as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ measures respect-
ively, this prompts us to re-evaluate the assumption that nonreligious categories
are a more effective measure of secularity than religious ones. In fact, where reli-
gious identiﬁcations are the norm, it is arguably more likely that someone indiffer-
ent to these themes will afﬁliate with a religious rather than a nonreligious
category. Being ‘indifferent’ to religion implies a degree of intellectual, practical
and emotional detachment and it would be reasonable to assume that people
experiencing this detachment would follow the path of least resistance when it
comes to self-classiﬁcation; given that the majority, albeit a small and fragile
one,3 still afﬁliate with a religion in the UK, religious afﬁliation is more likely to
offer this than a nonreligious afﬁliation. In places where religious afﬁliation is
declining, nonreligious categories are the newer option and are therefore more
likely to require the individual to actively switch to them than is the case for domi-
nant or once-dominant religious classiﬁcations. The data in Table 1 support this
view in that they suggest that people are more likely to wear their religiosity
lightly than they are their nonrelgiosity: the majority of those identifying as reli-
gious describe their attachment in moderate terms whereas the majority of those
identifying as nonreligious describe their attachment more forcefully. It possibly
follows that people in this and similar contexts are more likely to be nominally reli-
gious than they are to be nominally nonreligious.
Indifference is, then, a phenomenon that is poorly captured by afﬁliation stat-
istics and synchronic analysis, partly because people overstate their indifference
and even use it as an emic category to position themselves (indifferentism) and
partly because looking at afﬁliation alone does not reveal the signiﬁcance of that
afﬁliation. Rather, in pluralist landscapes in which religious and nonreligious
afﬁliations are equally familiar and socially permitted, the best measure of indiffer-
ence is a longitudinal study which captures casual or arbitrary switching between
options in a manner that survey researchers would not be able to predict (Siegers
2010). Diachronic analysis, such as the work of Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam
(2010) showing large numbers of people switching between religious and nonreli-
gious categories in the US, might be a more effective methodology for capturing
indifference. This point is extremely important for those who understand secular
society to be a more or less postreligious one and attempt to use afﬁliation to
3A full 50 to 60 percent afﬁliated with a religion in most years of the last decade in the British Social Atti-
tudes survey, apart from 2009 when 51 percent said they had no religion.
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religious and nonreligious categories to understand the extent to which this has or
has not occurred.
The nonreligionisation of society
If the number of people adopting nonreligious identities neither proves nor dis-
proves that secularisation has occurred but is instead independent of it (Field
2014), this research suggests that afﬁliation data are useful for measuring nonreli-
gion itself, that is, the number of people who recognise themselves as other than
religious, and for measuring ‘nonreligionisation’ processes. Just as the number of
people identifying with a religion is inclusive of the nominally religious, so the
number of people identifying as nonreligious will be inclusive of the nominally
nonreligious, thus neither ﬁgure can be interpreted as a perfect measure of religi-
osity or nonreligiosity. However, these ﬁgures provide a general indication of
both populations and observing the changing ratio between them can be used to
get an overview of the balance of power between them.
That said, it is important to recognise that the nonreligious population is not con-
ﬁned to the one identifying with nonreligious categories. Just as Day (2011) and
others have drawn out a distinction between religious populations and people
who identify as religious, this paper draws out an important difference between
nonreligious populations and people who identify as nonreligious. Even very
staunch nonreligious perspectives may not be identiﬁed with nonreligious cat-
egories. In my research, I met people who had or would consider identifying
with a religious category for reasons relating to tradition and family background,
or for strategic reasons to do with perceived beneﬁts that might follow particular
census ﬁndings. Nonreligious people might also have preferred to elect a speciﬁc
nonreligious identity such as ‘atheist’ or ‘humanist’ or, in the case of the census,
may have warmed to the international secularist Internet campaign which called
for people to protest against the gathering of data concerning religion by volunteer-
ing ‘Jedi Knight’ as a religion or similar. Although it is not clear that everyone
choosing the latter category did so for this reason (Singler, forthcoming), it is
likely that a sizable number of people did so in nonreligious secularist protest.
By the same token, nonreligious afﬁliates may be signiﬁcantly religious or spiritual
in their orientation but prefer to identify as nonreligious for one of the reasons out-
lined above. The population identifying with generic nonreligious categories is not
equivalent to the nonreligious population per se, just as that identifying with reli-
gious categories is not equivalent to the religious population.
It is necessary therefore to be speciﬁc about what nonreligious afﬁliation means,
namely the number of people who wish to represent themselves in contradistinc-
tion from religion. This is interesting and signiﬁcant in itself. Nonreligion can be
a ﬁrst-order category or used to describe a feature of an emic self-understanding
– and there is, as we have seen, no reason to believe that ‘atheism’, say, is more
likely to be an emic category than ‘nonreligion’, as many scholars have argued.
Some forms of nonreligious identiﬁcation are more minimal than others, such as
a Pagan identifying as nonreligious but having few nonreligious practices
beyond this. Even this, however, is a signiﬁcant cultural, social and political
phenomenon, and one that is possible in some cultural contexts and not others.
Whether nonreligious identiﬁcation reﬂects a minimal or maximal nonreligiosity,
it will be increasingly important to understand and chart nonreligious as well as
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religious and spiritual identities in diverse societies. Furthermore, better knowl-
edge of nonreligious cultures will advance our understanding of how nonreligion
and secularity relate to one another, whether nonreligion catalyses or hinders
secularity.
Conclusions
This article demonstrates that survey afﬁliation data are insufﬁcient for under-
standing processes of secularisation, but by opening up and crystallising the differ-
ence between nonreligion and secularity (see also Lee 2012a), it opens up
methodological possibilities for investigating both phenomena. This study and
its argument that generic nonreligious categories measure something fundamen-
tally substantial rather than insubstantial also have more immediate implications,
particularly regarding the interpretation and reporting of ‘non-afﬁliation’ data.
Despite a certain contradiction inbuilt to the act of positively choosing a negative
category, reporting often emphasises the negativity more strongly. This can be
done discursively, as in British Religion in Number’s (2012, np; emphasis added)
reporting of data from the British Social Attitudes survey: ‘Asked whether they
regarded themselves as belonging to any particular religion, 44 percent of adults
replied in the negative.’ Other accounts go further and omit the category altogether,
a tendency seen in both academic and journalistic writing. For example, the Guar-
dian (Booth 2012, np) excludes the ‘no religion’ population entirely from its report-
ing of 2011 census ﬁgures for England and Wales:
[In 2011, ‘Jedi Knight’] remains the biggest single category after the leading faiths
of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism and Buddhism. It ranked
higher than followers of other established religions, including Rastafarians (just
7,906 in England and Wales), Jains (20,288) and Baha’i (5,021).
Because Booth lists ‘categories’ rather than ‘religions’, his list is simply inaccurate.
In fact, it excludes not only the second largest category recorded in the census but
arguably the third largest also: the ‘no religion’ and the ‘not stated’ respectively. If
the latter omission might be explained in terms of its not being a category that was
offered on the closed list of options presented in the census, the exclusion of the ‘no
religion’ category is clearly erroneous and seriously distorts our understanding of
‘religious landscapes’. For example, in this case, the size and proportion-share of
minority religious afﬁliations are exaggerated, whilst the much larger ‘no religion’
and ‘not stated’ groups, which exceed the size of all minority groups combined and
several times over, are obscured entirely. Given the politicisation of immigrant reli-
gions and of Islam, such distortions are not merely inaccurate but are potentially
dangerous in their effects.
As well as these discursive issues, the understanding of nonreligious categories
as negative also shapes analysis of these and other data. Most obviously, effectively
excluding generic nonreligious categories from afﬁliation data leads to a huge
under-reporting of nonreligious identiﬁcation, such that these ﬁgures are out of
step with other measures of nonreligion. Failing to historicise nonreligious identi-
ties also curtails various lines of research and is associated with incoherent research
designs. To take another example from journalistic commentary on the 2011
England and Wales census, the Guardian (Morris 2012) attempted to investigate
regions with high numbers of people reporting ‘no religion’ by exploring, not the
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appeal of this type of self-description, but the declining popularity of Christianity,
through interviews with local clergy. Between 2001 and 2011, the England and
Wales census did record a decline in people identifying as ‘Christian’ that was
similar in scale to the increase in people identifying as having ‘no religion’, and
there may well be a relation between the two. The data used in this article do
not show this, however, and treating the two as sides of the same coin makes a
leap that might be misleading. Moreover, it obscures other possibilities, not least
that people might have been moved to choose ‘no religion’ for a positive reason.
It also implies that Christianity is an unstable religious category whilst others are
ﬁxed and vital, which is to extrapolate beyond the data in a way that might
again feed into simplistic and problematic notions of the nature of different reli-
gious cultures in Britain today. In short, recognising the extent to which generic
nonreligious categories actually express a variety of substantive positions opens
up new lines of enquiry and promises a better understanding of the quantitative
data that we have available.
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